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.ABSTRACT:^ ;

Proposition 209: The Califbmk electorate passed a conistitiiti^nal amettdmmt by
initiative,by a 54-46%vote onNovember 5, 1996. It is now Article I, Section 31 ofthe

California Constitution. Koposition 209 and''Yes on 209"can^ai^ were projects of
Califomians Against Discriniination and Preferences(GADAP). CADAP was also an

intervener in the recehtly concluded litigation over the constitutionality ofrneasure
(CoalitionforEconomicEqmty v. Pete Wilson etal).

This&cialchaUehgeto Article I,Section 31 ofthe Califomi^ State Constitution
failed. Qn Novendier 3,1997,the U. S. Supreme Court denied certiorariin the case,

letting stand the Ninth U.S. Circuit Court ofi^peals decision ofApril1997which
strongly upholdsthe constitutionality oftile measure.
The economic affects to the small minority or wonm owned jiusinesses are
explored. The affect Proposition 209 has on education due to the California Constitution

change is reviewed. The affect Proposition 209 has on affumative aption in CaUfomia is
assessed.
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CHAPTER ONE .

Thebic^tioii

The California electorate passed a constitutional amendment by initiative, by a 54

46%yOte on November 5,1996 which became.Article I, Section pi ofthe Cahfomia
Constitution. This initiative was asthe result ofProposition 209. Proposition 209 and

the"Yes on 209"can:]paign were projects ofCalifomians A,gainst Discrimination and
Prefer^ces(CADAP). CADAP was also ap intervenorin the recently concluded

litigation overthe constitutionaHty ofthe meaisure(Coa//WdK^r£co«pwicJ^Mf^ Pete
Wilson etal.). (5-1)

The initial challenge to Article I, Section 31 ofthe Califomia State Constitution
faded. On November 3,1997,the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorariin the case,let

stand the Ninth U.S. Circuit Court ofAppeals decision ofApril 1997 which stron^y
upholdsthe constitutionality ofthe measure. CADAP was created in August 1994 bythe
California Civil Rights Mtiatrves(CCRI),co-authors Glynn Custred,Thomas Wood,and

Larry Amn. The key operative provisions ofthis measure States: "The state shallnOt
discriminate against.Or grant preferentialtreatmentto anyindividual or group on the basis
ofrace, sex, color,ethnicity, or national origin in thd Operation ofpublic enp)loyment,

public education, or public contracting,"(6-1)
White votersfiieled the 54-46%victoryfor the constitutional amendmept ending

race and gender based anti-discrimination projgramsin state,county^ and city hiring,
contracting,and schooladmissions. The vote rode a de^ racial divide,according to an

Examiner/Voter News Service exit poll. Whites voted for Proposition 209,blacks and

Latinos voted against, Mdiile Asian American voters were ^lit(4-1). Only San Francisco

and six other counties; Akmeda,Marin,San Mateo,Santa Clara, jSanta Cruz and Los
Angeles voted against the proposition(2-2).

When it went into efifect at 12:01 a.m.,August 28,1997,a cofihtion ofcivilrights

attorneys planned to file at least one federal court lawsuit challenging the law as

unconstitutional. The American CivilLiberties Union(ACLU),the Lawyers'Committee,
the California Labor Federation, wd others planned a morning press conference in San
Francisco to talk about the suit, which would seek to keep the law from being enforced.
(13-1) ■

Proponents,opponents,and San Francisco City Attorney Louii^ Renne predicted
an onslaught oflawsuits,both pro aid con. Some would atten^tto block the law;others
would atten^tto force cities, counties,school systems and collegesto con^ly with it.
Much ofthe legal wrangling revolved around the question ofwhat,precisely, constituted a
'preference".(13-1)

With its burgeoning ethnic diversity,Califomia hasbecome tl^e spawning ground
for voter-driven responsesto racial and economic insecurities and a trendsetter for the

nation. Aswith Proposition 187,passage ofProposition 2Q9is e]xpected to spark an
explosion ofsimilar legislation acrossthe United States. Cities analogousto San

Francisco believe alltheir aflSrmative action programs were legalunder Proposition 209,
even their minority and women-owned busmesses.(13-2)

Cities were expected to be a party to lawsuits over Proposition 209 one way or
another, whether their programs are sued by people who believe they discriminate or

whethertheyjoin tJie legal effortsto pvertum Rropositiori 209. Proponents ofthe
measure,which poUshad consistently shown to he winners,wereJubiljant/ Governor Pete
Wilson,a leading supporter ofProposhion209 said the can^aign against it exaggerated
itsimpact.(13-2)

Wilson staited,"The civillights protectionsthat arefederalahjd statelaw not only
will stayin place,they will be vigorouidy enforced. We will move as early as we can to

inplemeht it, butiamnot sure oflawsuitsfiled agaiust it,becpusepeople who are
opposed will seek to delay the implementation aslong asthey can."

Opponentstried to putthe bestface on theirloss. Feminist M^orityPresident md
Stop Proposition 209 Stalwart Elhe Smealin LosAngeles stated,"theyfelt they put up

one hell ofa fi^t." Their position was,that wasround one! They stated they were going
to fight thisin other states and in Congress, They assured that without a huge infusion of

cash bythe Republican Party,theforcesofProposition 209 would pot have prevailed.
They blamed what they called deceptive wording ofthe proposal,which did notinclude

the words"jfflSrniative action."(13-2)

Paterson,aleader ofDefeatProposition 209,stated that,'Syhen he was walked
into the voting booth that morning,andhe read the language to Proposition 209,he

couldn't believe anyone would be against it,it soundslike a combhijatiott ofMalcolm X
and Martin Luther King,"

The use ofKing's wordsand iniagein a G^P TV ad forProppsitioh 209 sparked
outrage among cMlrightsleaders and caused a nasty dust-up between the party and the

Proposition 209 can^aign,which had tried to sellthe proposition as a nonpartisan issue.

It was heavily bankrolled by the RepubUcan Party,which saw an opportunityto convert
affirmative action into the kind ofwedge issue that hnmigration wasfor its candidates in
1994.

Jennifer Nelson,spokeswoman for the Proposition 209 can^aign,said the nation's
i

.

■

eyes were on California's vote. "With the passage ofProposition 209,1think we've

created momentum nationallyto erase race and gender preferencesi^ other states and in
Congress,"she said, 'This sends a strong message to the White House".(13-2)

Atthis point,a better wayto get an idea on the objection to ^proposition 209 can
best be understood bylooking at information provided bythe Feminist Majority
Movement,as provided by Eleanor SmeaL The following ^re questions and answers

provided by the Feminist Majority Movement. (9-2)
Questions and Answers about California's*^0"Vote On Proposition 209
(1) What is affirmative action?
Affirmative action refers to programsthat seek to remedy past discrimination

against women,minorities, and others by increasing the recruitment,promotion,retention

and on-the-job training opportunitiesin enq)loyment and by rernoving barriersto
admission to educationalinstitutions. Because ofthe long history ofdiscrimination-based

sex and race,most affirmative action programs have been directed towardsinq)roving
en^loyment and education opportunitiesfor women and minorities.(8-1)
(2) What kind ofstrategies does aflSrmative actimiinclude?

Affirmative action strategiesinclude expanding the pool ofjob or admission

application through recruitment strategies which reach outi^de ofusual or traditional

channels. This helpsto ensure that a fairer representation ofqualified women and

minorities are available to applyfor admissions orjobs. An exan:q>le,^e mailing
admissions apphcationsto female high school seniors and posting ofjob notices in places
where women and namorities are more likelyto see them Strategies in en^loyment
include an increase in on-the-job training opportunitiesthat increase occupational mobility

within the workplace. These strategies may be instituted bylaw pr coiut decree,or
voluntarily to increase the pool ofqualified apphcants and to diversifythe workplace.
(&-1)

(3) Doesn't afiBrmative action mean we take less qualified candidates? Isn't that wrong in
education and training?

Public aflSrmatwe action programs specifically do not allotythe acceptance of
unqualified applicants or workers. There is a difference,however,between affirmative

action instituted bylaw or court decree,following legal guidelines that we see in public
situations and those programsthat private businesses or institutions apply on a voluntary
basis.(8-1)

We have traditionally accepted less qualified candidatesin education because it
"served a greater purpose"to do so. The prime exaicple is the preferential acceptance of
children and relatives ofalumni—not women and minorities. These ate overwhehning

beneficiaries ofpreferentialtreatment at colleges and universities, greater than the number

ofminorities and women accepted throu^ afSrmative action programs. The slots
reserved for children ofalumni are call'legacy"seats. Thislegacy preference in
admissions has,in many cases,resulted in the acceptance ofless qualified candidates over

better-qualified candidates. The legacy prefereuces are believed to especially benefit

whites, niales, and the children ofwealthy ahmmi(8-1)
There are many exanqjlesoftiiis preferentialtreatment. Children ofahmmi at

Harvard University,in 1991 were three times more likelyto be accepted than other
prospective students. At Yale,children ofahmmi are two and halftimes more likely to be
admitted, hi 1992,Dartmouth gave admission to 57%ofitslegacy applicants and only

27%ofother students. The University ofPennsylvania accepted 66% ofalumnus'

children. Twenty-five percent ofNotre Dame'sfreshmen classis saved for the children of
alumni.

In unions and certain occupations,preferentialtreatment hastraditionally been
given to the relatives and fiiends ofenq)loyees and management,especially at the entry
level where unskilled enq)loyees receive on thejob training that qualifies them for
advancement.(8-1)
(4) What would Proposition209 do?

Because it isloosely written,no one knows how the courts willinterpret
Proposition 209. There are afew areas,however,where we do know what it islikely to
do. According to the non-partisan California Legislative Analyst,Propoi^on 209 would

"eliminate most aflBrmative action programsfor women and minoritiesijrun by state or local
governments". This meansProposition 209 will(8-2):

1.

End aflBrmative action outreach programsfor womjen and minoritiesin
governmentjobs and contracts;

2.

Prohibit courtsfrom ordering aflBrmative action reme<|ies even in cases of

proven race and sex discrimiiiation;
3.

In^eril workmen's centers and rape crisis centers on college canq)uses;

4.

Scrap math and science programsfor girls;

5.

Eliminate magnet schools designed to desegregate school districts.

(5) Is preferentialtreatment wrong?

Preferentialtreatmentislegaljargon. Proposition 209 wouli|i outlaw any
aflBrmative action program including outreach,recruitment,training,hiring,contracting,

and other programs which increase opportunitiesfor women apd minorities. It conhises
the cure for discrimination with discrimination itself A critical ai^ect ofProposition 209
isthat it only prohibits actions based on gender Or race.(9-3)

Other groups. Such as veterans,relatives,legacies,or people over 65 years old are
still allowed to have preferentialtreatment and to seek other t5^es ofpreferential

treatment through legal action. The issue that preferentialtreatment is undesirable seems

to onlyinterest the supporters ofProposition 209\^ilen it doesn't ^pplyto them (8-2)
Since Proposition 209 prohibitslegislation that benefits people based only on
gender and race and not based on age,relations,veteran status, or where they wentto
school, women and minorities have to pass over a higher hurdle to have new legidation to

benefit them as con^ared to other groups. This preferentialtreatment isimconstitutional.
(8-2)

(6) Whap about Clause"C"?
Clause"C" reads: "Nothingin this section diall be interpreted as prohibiting bona
fide qualifications based on sex vvMch are reasonably necessary to the normal operation of

public employment,public education,or public contracting." According to some

Califomialaw professors. Clause"C"creates a constitutionalri^tto incriminate against
women and girls.(4-1)

Thephrase,'Reasonably necessary"in Clause"C"istjie criticalissue here. In

Califomia,the standard against sex discrimination states that it isillegalto discriminate

based on gender unlessit is necessaryto achieve a "compelling purpose". Califomia has
the hi^est standard in the nation because it isthe equivalent to the EqualRights
Amendment. The standard for gender discrhnination is somewhatlower in federallaw

because the EqualRi^ts Amendment wasnever passed. The"reasonably necessary"
standard islower still. Proposition 209,Clause"C"will allow discriniination based on

gender ifit is'Reasonably necessary to the normal operation ofpublic enployment,public

education,or public contracthig." Thisis a lower standard thatlegal ejj^erts sayis easyto
prove in court tod willresult in women lo^g the equal opportunitythat they currently

have achieved. Argumentsthat won't hold watertoday will be acceptable and women will
not be hired or given opportunities because ofperceived or possible gender issues,such as
pregnancy interfering with ni^t work.(8-2)
(7) Why are we opposed to Proposition 209?

The so-called Califomia Civil Right's Initiative, which is neidjer civil nor right,is

reaUy a deceptive atten^t to constitutionalize gtoder discriipination tod slam shut the

doors ofopportunitythat both women and people ofcolor havefought so hafd to open.
It places a hurdle to minorities and women that is hot placed to others\^^o seek
legislation tp benefit them (8-2)

(8) What doesthe Supreme Court rejection ofPropo^ion 209 mean?
On November 3,1997,the US Supreme Court rejected a broad challenge to

Califomia'sProposition 209, ITiis decision wasto rule against hearing the appealfiled by
the American Civil Liberties Union claiming that govenimiPHit snrnetimes has''an

aflBhmative dutyto eir^loy race prefer^ces"to make up for past or present disciirQihation
against nunorities. This setsthe stage for fidl enforcement ofProposition 209. However,
since Propositibn 209 doesnot change federallaws and since many ofCalifomia'slocal

programsgetfederalftmding,many situations exist where Proposition 209 can't be
implemented. However,individual situations where past or present discrimination based

on gender or race in public employment,education or contracting pan stdt be litigated.
These may\^d their wayup to the Supreme Court and pfowde a wayto challenge

Proposition 20^in the future.(8-2)
Following are argumentsin fevor ofProposition 209 b|ythe Americansfor
America.

The Rightlldni^To Do

A generation ago,we did it ri^t We passed civilrightslawsto prohibit
discrimination. But spedalinterests hijackedthe civilrights movement. Mstead of

equality, governmentsimposed quotas,preferences,and set-asides. Proposition 209is

called the CaJifomia Civil RightsInitiative because it restatesthe historic Civil Rights Act
and proclaims sinply and clearly:"The state shall not discriminate against. Or grant

preferentialtreatment to,anyindividual or group,on the basis ofrace,sex,color, ethnicity
or national origin in the operation ofpublic enplOyment,public education,or public

contracting."(2-1)

"Reverse discrimination"based on race or genderis plain wrong,and two wrongs

don't make a right. Today,students are being rejected from public universities because of
their race. Job apphcants are turned away because their race doesnot meet some "goal"

or "timetable." Contracts are awarded to high bidders because they are ofthe preferred

race. The government should not discriminate. It must not give ajot), a university

admission,or a contract based on race or sex. t^vemment mustjudge all people equally,
without discrimination. Proposition 209 keepsin place allfederal and state protections
against discrimination.(2-1)

Government cannot work against discrimination ifgovernment itselfdiscriminates.
Proposition 209 will stop the terrible programs which are dividiag our people and tearing

us apart. People naturallyfeelresentment when the less qualified arp preferred. We are
all Americans, It's time to bring ustogether under a single standard ofequaltreatment
under the law. Discrimination is costly in other ways. Government agenciesthroughout

California spend millions ofyour tax dollarsfor costly bureaucraciesto administer racial

and gender discriinination that masquerades as"afiSrmative action." They waste much

more ofyour money awarding hi^-bid contracts and sweetheart deals based not on the
low bid,but on imfrir set-asides and preferences. This money could be used for police

and fire protection,better education,and other programswhich would benefit everyone.

■(2-2) ^
The better choice, he^) only those who needhelp. We are individuals, not every

white personis advantaged, andnot evety "minority" is disadvantaged. Real affirmative

action originally meansno discrimination and seeksto provide opportunityto all. That's
why Proposition 209 prohibits discriniination and preferences or allows preference
because ofrace or sex,to continue. The onlyhonest and effective wayto address

inequality ofopportunityis by making sure that all California children are provided with

the toolsto compete in our society, and theylet tiiem shcceed on a fair, color-blind and

race blind basis. Let'snot perpetuate the myth,that niinorities and women cannot
conmete without specialpreferences. Let'sinstead move forward by returning to the
hmdamentals ofour democracy;ie.,individual achievement,equal opportunity,and zero
tolerance for discrimination against or for anyindividual. Pete Wilson,Governor, State of

California,Ward Connerly,Chairmen California CivilRight?Initiative, and Pamela A.
Lewis,co-Chair, Califomia CivilRi^ts Initiative, signed this document.(2-2)
Rebuttal,"In Favor ofProposition 209"

A generation ago,Rosa Parkslaunched the civilrights movement which opened
the door to equal opportunity for women and minoritiesin this country. Park is against

this deceptive initiative. Proposition 209 highjacked civil rightslanguage and used legal
lingo to gut protections against discrimination. Proportion 209 saysit eliminates quotas,
but in fact,the U. S. Supreme Court already decided twice,that they are illegal.

Proposition 209's purpose,isto eliminate aflBrmative action and equal opportunity

programsfor qualified women and minorities,including tutoring,outreach,and mentoring
programs.(3-1)
Proposition 209 changesthe California Constitution to permit state and local

governmentsto discriminate against women,by excluding them fi'omjob categories.
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Ward Connerly has already used hisinfluence to get children ofhis rich and powerM

fiiendsinto the University ofCalifornia. Proposition 209 reinforcesthp,"who you know"
^stem which favorscronies ofthe powerfiilopposition. 'There are those vsdio say, we

can stop how,America is a color-blind society. Butit isn't yet. There are those who say
we have a level plajmg field,but we don't yet." Stated retired General Colin Powell,
(5/25/96).(3-1)

Background

The federal, state, and local governmentsrun many programsintended to increase

opportunitiesfor variousgroups-^including women and racial and eth^c minority groups.
These programs are commonly called "affirmative action" programs. For exan^le,state

law identifies specific goalsfor the participation ofwomen-owned ^d minority-owned
cort^anies on work iavolved with state contracts. State departments are ej^ected,but
not required,to meet these goals\Ndiich include that at least 15%ofthe value ofcontract

work should be done by nhnority-owned conq)anies and at least 5%should be done by
women-owned conq)^es.Thelaw requires departments,hoyvever,to reject bidsfi-om

cortqjaniesthat have not made sufficient"good faith efforts"to meetthese goals. (3-1)
Other exanq)les ofaflSrmative action programs mclude:

•

Public college and university programs,such as scholarships,tutoring, and
outreach that are targeted toward minority or womenstudents.

•

Goals and timetablesto mcourage the hiring ofmembers of"under-represented"
groupsfor state govemmeutjobs.

•

State and localprogramsrequired bythe federal government as a condition of

12

receiviiig federalfimds(such as requirementsfor mmority-owned business
participation in state highway construction projectsfunded in part with federal
money).
Proposal

This measure would eliminate state and local government aflSrmative action
programsin the areas ofpubhc employment,public education, and public contracting to
the extent these programsinvolve "preferential treatment" based on race,sex, color,

ethnicity, or national origin. The spedfic programs affected by the measure,however,
would depend on such factors as;(1)coiut rulings on what types ofactmties are

considered "preferentialtreatment"and(2)whetherfederallaw requiresthe continuation
ofcertaip programs. (12-2)

The measure provides exceptionsto the ban on prqferenjiialtreatment,when
necessary,for any ofthe following reasons:

•

To keep the state or local governments eligible to receive moneyfirom thefederal
government.

•

To con^ly with a court orderin force as ofthe effective date pfthis measure(the
day after the election).

•

To con^ly with federallaw QitheThihed StatesG^stftution.

•

To meet privacy and other consideratidns based on sex that are reasonably

necessarytothe normaloperation ofpubhc err^loyment,pubhc education,or
pubhc contracting.
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Fiscal Effect

Ifthis measureis approved by the voters,it could affect a variety ofstate

and local programs. These programs are discussed in detail:
Public Employment and Contracting

The measure would eliminate afBrmative action programs used to increase hiring
and promotion opportunitiesfor state or local governmentjobs,where sex,race, or

ethnicityis a preferentialfactor in hiring,training,promotion,or recruitment decisions. In
addition,the measure would eliminate programsthat give preference tp women-owned or
minority-owned con^anies on public contracts. Contracts affected bythe measure would

include contractsfor construction projects,purchases ofcort^uter equipment,and the
hiring ofconsultants. These prohibitions would not applyto those government agencies
that receive moneyimderfederalprogramsthat require such afBrmative action. (12-2)

The elimination ofthese programs would result in savingsto the state and local
governments. These savings would occurfor two reasons. First, government agencies no
longer would incur coststo administer the programs. Second,the prices pmd on some

government contracts would decrease. This would happen because l^idders on contracts
no longer would need to show"good feith efforts"to use minority-owned or women-

owned subcontractors. Thus,state and local governments would save pioneyto the extent
they otherwise would have rejected a low bidder—because the bidder did not make a
"good feith effort"—and awarded the contract to a higher biddi». (12-2)
Based on available information,it is estimated that the measure would result in

savingsin eroployment and contracting programsthat could totdtens ofmillions of
U

dollars each year.(11-2)
Public Schools and Cominuiiity^CpUeges

The measure also could affect fimdhig for public schools(Idndergaiten through
grade 12)and community college programs. Forinstmice,the measure could eliminate,or

cause hmdamental changesto,

desegregation programsrun by school districts.

(It would not,however,affect cowrt-orvieret/desegregation programjs.)Exan^lesof
desegregation pending that could be affected bythe measure include the special hmding

given to: (1)"magnet"schools(in those cases\\iiererace or ethni(^ity are preferential
factorsin the admission ofstudentsto the schools)and(2)designated "racially isolated

minority schools"that are located in areas with high proportions ofpcial or ethnic
minorities. It is estimated that up to $60 milhon ofstate and localfunds spent each year

on voluntary desegregation programs may be affected bythe measure.(12-2)
In addition,the measure would affect a variety ofpublic school and community

college programs such as coimseling,tutoring,outreach,studet^tsfinancial aid,and
financial aid to selected school districtsin tiiose cases where the programs provide

preferencesto individuals or schools based on race,sex,ethnicity,ornational origin.
Funds spent on these programstotalat least $15 million each year.(12-2)
Thus,the measure could affect up to $75 rbillion in^ate spendingin public schools
and conimunity colleges. The State Constitution requiresthe state to spend a certain

amount each year on public schoolsand community colleges. Asa rpsult,under most
situations,the Constitution would require thatfunds which cannot be ^ent on programs
because ofthis measure instead would have to be spentfof other public schools and

commimity college programs. (12-3)
University ofCalifornia and California State University

The measure would affect admissions and other programs at the state's public
universities. For exan^le,the CaUfomia State University(CSU)uses race and ethnicity as
&ctorsin some ofits admission decisions. Ifthis initiative is passed by the voters,it could
no longer do so. In 1995,the Regents ofthe University ofCalifornia(UC)changed the

UC's admissions policies. Effective for the 1997-98 academic year,UC eliminated all

consideration ofrace or ethnicity. Passage oftihis initiative bythe voters might require the
UCto inq)lement its admission policies somewhat sooner.(12-3)

Both university systems run a variety ofassistance programsfpr students,fecidty,
and staff \\bich are targeted to individuals based on sex,race, or ethnicity. These include
programs such as outreach,counseling,tutoring, and financial aid. Thetwo systems
spend over $50 million each year on programsthat probably would be affected by passage
ofthis measure.(12-3)
Summary

As described above,tWs measure could affect state and local programsthat

currently cost wellin excess of$125 million annually. The actual amopnt ofthis spending
that might be saved as a result ofthis measure could be considerably less,for various

reasons(12-4):

•

The amount ofspending affected bythis measure could b^less depending on:
(1)court rulings on vv^iat types ofactivities are considered,"preferential

treatment"and(2)whetherfederallaw requires continuation pfcertain programs.
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•

In most cases, any fiindsthat could not be spentfor existing programsin public

schools and community colleges would haveto be spent on o^er programsin the
schools and colleges.

•

hi addition,the amount effected as a result ofthis measure iwould be lessifany

existmg afBrmative action programs were declared unconstitutionalunder the
United States Constitution. For exanq)le,"five"state aflBrmatwe action programs

are currently the subject ofa lawsuit. Ifany ofthese programs arefound to be
unlawfiil,tbeu the state could no longer spend money on ^em~regardless of
\\dietber this measure isin effect.(6-1)

•

Finally,some programs we have identified asbeing aff^^d mi^t be changed to
use factors other than those prohibited bythe measure. For exan^le,a hi^ school
outreach program operated bythe UC or the CSU that currently uses a fector such

as ethnicity to target spending could be changed to target hi^ schools with low
percentages ofUC or CSU applications,(12-4)

Considering the pros and consto Proposition 209,and the effect thatthis change
has on the Califomia Constitution,there is a need to take a look at the constitutionality of

this proposition. Chapter two deal with thistopic fi"om the legal point ofview.
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CHAPTER TWO

The Constitutionality ofPropoatioii 209

entrenched discrinunation ensures a£5nnatiye action a place as one ofthe most
contentious issues ofthe late twentieth century, exponents ofafiSrmative action argue

thatthe Equalftotection Clause ofthe Fourteenth Amendmentis premised on an

individual's right notto be subject to any goyemmehtalrace-based classification.

Proponentsrespond that Ae goalofequality willbe a hollow pledge ut^essrace-conscious
eflforts can be used to remedy discrimination. Federallaw stands somewhere between

these extremes. It allowslawmakersto take race and gender into account in narrow

instancesto remedyidentified discrmunation. Federal courts and the EqualEn^loyment

Opportunity Commission(EEGC)havetraditionally defined the lin^its on public sector
aflSrmative action,and most states have not established substantially different standards

under state law. However,in November 1996,Califotnia voters adopted Proposition 209
which amended the state constitution to bar public entitiesfrom granting preferential

treatment on the basis ofrace,sex,color, ethnicity,or nationalorigin^ (7-2081)
Before Propoi^ion 209 was put to the voters,its opponentsfiled an unsuccessfid
lawsuit claiming that the initiative cloaked a categorical ban on afiirmative action in

traditional anti-discrimination Imiguage. Although a Ninth Circuit Court panellater held
that Proposition 209did not violate the equal protection clause on itsface,that decision
failed to end the litigation surrounding Proposition 209,and many issues remain unsettled.
Several city and county governments have indicated that they willterminate all afBrmative

.
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action programs because they believe either thatthey are alreadyin compliance with

Proposition 209,or that Proposition 209 may beunconstitutionalas applied in certain

situations. At tiie same time Proposition 209 may be unconstitutional as applied in certain
situations. Uncertainty over the scope ofProposition 209's prohibition may have led some
governmentsto suspend programsthat the amendment does not actually ban.

Just as Califomia's Governor Pete Wilson hasvowed th^t he will vigorously
enforce the ban,civil ri^ts grOupsare exaraining waysJo blunt its intact. Because

Galifomia encon^asses 500 dties,58 counties,and 5,000 specialdistricts,the battle over
in^lementing Proposition 209 is likelyto be exteniSive. As many commentators note,the

m:q)ortance ofthis battle sweeps beyond Cahfomia politic^ because the adoption of
Proposition 209 has encouraged other statesto reconsider their afiBrmative action

programs. This paper examines some argumentsthat might be raised tp challenge and limit
Proposition 209 and similarfuture laws. The following asks,first, whether a state
government may prevent courtsfrom using race conscious measures^o remedy violations

offederallaw. Then it examines whether a state hasthe authorityto limit voluntary af
jBrmative action available under Title Vn to en^lOyers with workforces segregated by race
orgender. (7-2082)

Afterprovidingthe backgroundto thelegalskirmishessurrc^undingProposition
209,subsection titled,'Interpreting Proposition 209" explores some possible
interpretations ofProposition 209to assessits scope. Subsection,'fThe Ninth Circuit's
Ruhng on Proposition 209",e?^lainsthe Ninth Circmt Court'sruhng'm Coalitionfor

EconomicEquity v. Wilson. Subsection,"The Impact ofPropoi^ion 209 on Court
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Ordered and Approved Affirmative Action"arguesthat a state maynotforbid courtsthat

hear federal causes ofaction from ordering or approviug in consent fiecrees,race or
gender consciousrehefin order to eradicate the effects ofidentified discrimination when
such reliefis necessaryto remedy constitutional or federal statutory violations. In such

instances,the Supremacy Clause requires state courtsto follow federallaw.
Subsection,"Voluntary Affirmative Action Under the Constitution and Title VU",argues

that Proposition 209 cannot be apphed to prohibit government enq)loyersfrom using
affirmative action when there is a"strong basis in evidence"that thqy may be subject to

underlying Title VU. The conclusion summarizesthe permissible s^ope ofProposition
209's prohibition on affirmative action in li]^t ofconflicts with the FederalConstitution
and Title Vn. (7-2083)

Interpreting Proposition 209
In order to assess the circmnstances in which race or gender conscious remedies

might be allowed,notwithstanding Proposition 209,one mustfirst have a generalidea of
the initiative's scope.Proposition 209'sfirst clauses,"the state shall not discriminate

against"™ singly restates existing anti-discrinnnation law and hasno]t been challenged in
court. The remainder ofthe prohibition does not require a categorical ban on affirmative

action;its plain language prohibits only the more limited category of'preferential
treatment." (7-2083)

AfiSrmative action is a broad term thatincludes preferenpes,byt also encon^asses
targeted training and recruiting effortsthat fall short ofan expfidt preference in selection
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based on race or gender. '^Preference"is a narrower term,used only when a person would
not have received a benefit exceptfor his/her race or gender. Set ^sides, quotas,and
selection processesin which race is used as a"plus"that provides a decisive advantage
would qqalify as preferences.
Some uses ofrace and gender,however,may not constitute preferences per se.

Forinstance,onecould regard a notification program thattm'getsunder represented races

as an aUocation ofpubhcfimdsbai^d on race,and fiius a'preference." However,
assuming that information about a government program ispublicly available and fiiat

obtaining information doesnot en^e one's acceptance into file program,no real benefit
has been distributed or denied onfiie basis ofrace. Notification pro;^anis seek to equafi^

information among indmdualsbyfocusing onthose^oupsthat are pot receiving
information ayailable to others

npn mmority or male yfio doesnotbenefit firom the

targeted recrmting doeshot si^erifthere were other ayenueathfou^yvhich the
mfofmation was accessible to him (7-2084)

The best wayto imderstand the distinction between afiBrmatiye action and
preferencesisfiiat in orderfor a person to receive a preference, miother person,whether

identifiable or not,must suffer discrimination. For exann)le,the use yfbusing to achieve
schoolintegration is not a preference.

god ofbusing isto provide children with an

education in an integrated setting, a benefit that accruesto aU races. Further,busing does
not deny any child the opportunityto go to school and the burden ofbeing sentto a
different schoolis generally home by children ofallraces. (7-2084)

In interpreting Proposition 209,the California Supreme Court should acknowledge
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the difference between preferences and affirmative action. When it interprets a voter

initiative,the courtlooksfirsttothe initiative's plainlanguage. Althou^its drafl:ers could
have chosen to use aflBrmative action.Proposition 209 speaks only of"preferences."

Indeed,Proposition 209 proponents wantthe courtto prevent opponmtsfi"om changing
the initiative'slanguage which demonstratesthat both sides recognized the significance of
Proposition 209'sterminology. Second,the Califomia Supreme Court looksto voter

intent. When an initiative's language is ambiguous,Califomia courts mayturn to extrinsic
materialsto deduce the intent ofvoters,such asthe official ballot pan^hlet distributed to
all registered voters. The Proposition 209 ballot pan^hlet included two lengthy polemics

articulating the opposing sides ofthe issue. The argumentsin &vor ofProposition 209,
which were signed by Governor Wilson and Califomia Attomey General DanielLundren,

asserted that Proposition 209 bans discrimination and preferentialtreatment"period"smd
stressed that programs designed to ensure that all personsregardless ofrace or gender are
informed ofopportunities ... wfll continue as before. Further,propqnents argued,

afiSrmative action programsthat don't discriminate or grant preferentialtreatment wUlbe
unchanged. Thus,the proponents ofProposition 209recognized a di^ction between
aflBrmative action and preferences. Although Proposition 209 opponents suggested in the

pamphlet that Proposition 209 would ban aU aflBrmative action,the proponent'sin

terpretation,lAhich was endorsed bythe Govemor and Attomey Gaieral,was probably
perceived asthe more authoritative interpretation. (7-2085)

In addition,voter exit polls, will ofthe voter's intent,indicate that Califomia
voters did not intend to eradicate all aflBrtnatiye action. An exit poU r^ealed that 27% of
■
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those wiio voted for Proposition 209 stated that they supported aflBrmative action. At

least these voters did notthink they were banning all aflSrmative ^ction byvoting for
proposition 209. Another polltaken shortly before the election revealed that,"large
majorities ofCalifomians said,theyfevored at least some ofthe equal opportunity efforts

that fall under the afSrmative action label." Although a majority ofthose polled opposed
"preferences",approximately 75%fiivored minority recruiting.(7-2P85)
Moreover,a California appellate court has determined that afBrmative action and

preferences are dififerent, and that onlythe latter are banned byProppsition. 209. In

refiising to change the wording ofProposition 209 priorto the November 1996 vote,the
courtin Lun^en v. Superior Court declared that"any statementto the affect that
proposition 209 repeals afBrmative action programs would be over inclusive and hence,

false and misleading." For instance,the court noted,afBrmative action would include
outreach programs. Therefore, a broad interpretation that read Proposition 209to ban all

forms ofafBrmative action would conflict with the plahilanguage ofthe initiative as well
as voter intent. The California Supreme Court should adopt the approach taken in

Lungren and limit Proposition 209to prohibit only programs requiring preferences. (7
2086)

The Ninth Circuit Court RuUng on Proposition 209
Soon after voters passed Proposition 209,a coalition ofcivilrights groupsfiled a
§1983 action to enjoin Governor Wilson fi^om enforcing it. ChiefJudge Thelton E.

Henderson granted both a tenq)orary restraining order and a preliminary injunction

because he determined that the plaintiSs were likelyto prevail on their claimsthat
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Proposition 209 violated the EqualProtection Clause and was preen^ted by Title Vn.
However,in April 1997,the Ninth Circuit Court ruled in CoalitionforEconomic
Equity v. Wilson that Proposition 209 does not violate the EqualProtection Clause on its

face and is not preempted by Title VTI. In a caustic opinion,the paqellamented that a
"system which permits onejudge to block with the stroke ofa pen what 4,736,180 state

residentsvoted to enact aslaw teststhe integrity ofour constitutional democracy." The
court stated that the plaintiSs &iled to present a viable equalprotection challenge based
on "conventional"equal protection precedents because Proposition 2Q9,vriiich prohibits
racial classifications, did notits selfcreate a racial classification. Second,the court turned

to what it deemed "political structure"analysis,the purportedly unconventional approach

to equal protection elucidated by the Supreme Court in Hunter v. Erickson 53and
Washington v. Seattle SchoolDistrictNo.1.54. Hunter and Seattle suggested that states
cannot passlaws preventing minorities fi"om seeking anti-discrimination protections,such
as business programs,through the same political structure as all other citizens. The Niath
Circuit Court inq)lied that Hunter and Seattle were irreconcilable with more recent

Supreme Court cases stating that the right to equal protection inheres in iudividuals rather
than groups. (7-2086)

The Ninth Circuit Courtreasoned that Proposition 209 was distinguishable firom
the measures at issue in Hunter and

because it treats allissues in a neutral-fadiion

rather than singling out issuesthat affect a particular race or gender. Further,the panel
argued,that the Constitution permitsthe rare race-based or gender-based preference
hardlyinq)hes that the state cannot ban them alltogether. Thus,the court concluded that
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the EqualProtection Clause does not require afiSrmative action. The Supreme Court
declined to hear the appealfrom the Ninth Circuit Court decisidth-(7-2085)
The Impact ofProposition 209 On Court-Orderedi and Approved Affirmative
Action

Court-Ordered AfiBrmatrve Action: A key question posed by Proposition 209is
whether state law can stand as a barrier to the in^lementation ofrace and gender
conscious remediesthat are designed to address constitutional or {Statutory violations.

State and local governmentsinclement aflSrmative action in three ways. First,in rare
situations, a court that identifies a violation ofthe Constitution orfederallaw hasthe
authority to order race or gender-based measures as a remedy. Second,courts may

approve privately negotiated consent decreesto remedy past discritnination. Third,and
most commonly,aflBrmatrve action isircq)lemented by voluntary government action.

The Supreme Court approved a court-ordered preference as a remedyfor a
constitutional violation in United States v,Paradise. Paradise involved egregious

resistance to integration bythe Alabama Department ofPublic Safety. The Supreme
Court concluded that there was a"profound need and a firmjustification"for the court

in^osed quota and that"the government unquestionably had a conq)elling interest m
remedying past and present discrimination by a state actor." The court was satisfied that

the district court, which had att6iiq)ted other stmctionsto no avail,reasonably concluded
that the quota wasnecessary to eradicate discriminations. Therefore,the remedy survived
strict scrutiny and did not violate the EqualProtection Clause. (7-2088)

In cases such asParoc/we, the court has established that courts possessthe
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equitable power necessary to use federalrights. The court has gone so &r asto authorLze
a courtto order a school district to raise taxesto fimd a desegregation plan.Remediesfor
constitutional violations are essential both to conq)aisate victims and to ensure that

governrnent remains wi^in the bounds ofdielaw. Consequently,when'Tt has been found
that a particular remedyis required,the state cannot hinder the process by preventing a

local govermnentfoom inq)lenienting that remedy;''(7-2098)
Therefore, a criticalissue isvhether courts wiflinterpret Proposition 209to

restrict the remediesthey Can order. Proposition 209 declaresthatth^ state shallinclude,
but not necessarily be limited to,tile state itself any city, county,city and county,public
university system,inchiding the University pf"Califorma, cpnimiuuty college district,
school district, q>ecial district, or any other political subdivision or goverhmental

instrumentality ofor within the state. Thislanguage seerhsto encon^ass state and local
courts.(7-2098)

In addition, section 3-1(d)ofthe California Constitution providesthat'hothing in

this section shall be interpreted asinvalidating any court order or consent decree which is
in force as ofthe effective date ofthis section." This provision n^yinq)ly that proposition
209 wasintended to affect prospective court orders and consent decrees. In any event,
even ifstate courts are not covered as government instrumentalities, a govemmmtthat

granted preferentialtreatrnent pursuant to a court order or a consent decree would seem
to bp covered.(7-2089)
At least one commentator suggests that Proposition 209 may affect reliefordered
byfederal courts. However,the canon ofconstitutional avoidance,vshich requires that
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statutes bemteipreted to avoid constitutional conflicts,justifiesinterpreting Proposition
209to exclude remedies ordered byfederal courts^(7-2090)

Ifa court interpreted Proposition 209 as atten^ting to obstructfederal court
remedies.Proposition 209 would be unconstitutional as applied North Carolina State

Board ofEducation V. Swann established that states camnot block court-ordered remedies
for constitutionalviolations. North Carolma passed an anti-busing law to prohibit courts

from assigning studentsto particular schools on the basis ofrace. A unanimous Supreme

Court brushed the statute aside,declaring that state policy must^e\yay when it operates
to hinder vindication offederal constitutional guarantees. Reaching its result, despite the

statute's purportedfy neutralban on ah race-based assagnments,the cpurt noted that the
statute"would deprive school authorities ofdie one tool absolutely essentialto fidfillment

oftheir constitutional obligation to eliminate existing dual school sysjtems." (7-2090)
Similarly,Proposition 209,ifapplied to federal courts,would threaten to hanqier
the ability oflocal authoritiesto effectively remedy constitutionalviolations, Adnnttedly,
the North Carolina Act was a direct attenqjt to defythe Supreme Court's desegregation

rulingsin a waythat Proposition 209is not. Nevertheless,the Supreme Court's analysis
ofthe Anti-^Busing Act demonstratesthatthefocus ofthe analysis should be the effect of
the legislation on effortsto remedy discrunination,rather than an hijquiryinto invidious
intent bythe legidatures. Underthis rationale,any attemptto apply Proposition 209to
obstruct federal court remedies would beunconstitutional. (7-2091)

State courts are also bound bythe obligation to rbmedy constitutionalviolations,

even when the remedies conflict with statelaw. TheSupreme Cou(thasheld that state
n

courts must hear federal claimsin casesfor which Congress provides concurrent

jurisdiction. State courts generally may apply neutral state procedtnalrulesto federal
claims aslong asthey would applythe rulesto emalogoUs state claitns. However,in
Felder v. Casey,the Court struck down the application ofa state proceduralrule that
would have denied a remedyfor a constitutional violation. Commentators have

understood Felderto suggestthat rulesthat hi^ose a "substantive condition" on,and

thereby abridgefederalri^ts are invahd. Underfederallaw,courts can order preferential
reliefonly when it istruly necessary. The apphcmion ofProposition 209to a federal claim
would eviscerate necessary rehefand thus uhpose a substantive condition on federal
rights.(7-2091)

In a case,notinvolving preferentialrehe:^ the Supreme Court held that a district
court must determine that the rehefis"necessary"or"essential"ifthat rehefwould order

actionthat would violate state law. However,thisgeneralrequirementimposesno
additional hurdle for a court considering whether to require race-conscious rehef Strict

scrutiny,narrowly tailored requirements, already demands a &ding thatthe race
consciousrehefisnecessary in h^t ofrace-neutral alternatives. (7^2091)

Consent Decrees: Consent decrees are hj^ridsthat possess"attributes both of
contracts and of judicial decrees."

Local93,InternationalAssociatiori ofFirefighters

V. City ofCleveland,the court ahgncd consent decrees ordering preferentialrehefwith the
lenient standard apphcable to voluntary afiBrmative action instead ofthat apphcable to

court ordered rehefunderTitle Vn. Thus,the SupremeCourt estal^hdied those district
courts hearing Title Vn cases may approve consent decreesthat provide broader rehef
' 28-V
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than the district court could independently order.(7-2091)
An in:q)ortant issue thatthe court hasnot addressed is whether a court approving a
consent decree tiiat violates Proposition 209 must find an actual constitutional or statutory

violation before approving the decree. In Firefighters, the court difi not require such a
finding. Some circuit courts,however,relying on Missouri v. Jenkins, have held that a
finding ofan actualviolation is necessary before a court approves a decree authorizing the
partiesto disregard state law. However,Jenkins Tmoh/oA.taxation, a fimction historically

reserved to the states. Similarly, circuit court casesinq)osing such a requirement before a
court may approve a consent decree,have involved proposed agreementsthat required the

partiesto diverge fi^omlong-standing lawsin areasin vriiich states haye heightened
interestsin local control. Such reliefintrudes on tiie sovereignty oflocal governments by

restricting their authorityto manage their own afi^s. Yetthe principles offederalism
i
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underlying those decisions do not apply to Proposition 209. Approving a consent decree
that incorporates preferences tiiat are authorized under federallaw creates no comparable

intrusion on state sovereignty. Ifanything.Proposition 209's novel atten:q)tsto ban

practices authorized byfederallaw approaches an intrurion on federal authority.
Moreover,the Ninth Circuit Court,whose law govems Cahfomia eroployers,has
suggested that courts need not find an actual violation:. (7-2092)
In sum.Proposition 209 does not create a greater obstacle to court ordered or

approved preferencesthan does strict scrutiny. Because ofthe Supremacy Clause, state

courts bear an equal obligation to provide federally authorized remedies,whether those

remedies arise fi-om voluntary decrees or designed Ipy a court.(7-2093)
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Voluntary Affirmative Action Under The Constitution and Title VH

Affirmative action plansinstituted by public sector en^loyers must satisfy both the
Constitution and Title Vn. In City ofRichmond v. J.A. Croson Co. m&Adarand

Constructors,Inc. v. Perm,the Supreme Court established that all st^te and federal
government racial classifications are subjectto strict scrutiny. However,when assessing

whether aflBrmative action plans violate Title Vn,the court has adojpted a more lenient
"manifestimbalance"standard, which doesnot explicitly require a finding ofintentional

discrimination. In UnitedSteelworkers v. Weber,the court signaled its willingnessto
permit affirmative action under Title VH to eliminate manifest racialimbalancesin
traditionaUy segregatedjob categories. The court concluded that i^ was"clear that
[interpretive Title VH to bar afiSrmative action] would bring about an end corr^letely at

variance with the purpose ofthe statute." Ahhou^the court restricted its inquiryto what
action Title VH forbids,the Weber majority suggested that Congressintended affirmative
action to be an available toolto condensate for past discrimination. (7-2093)

In 1987,ih&coxat'mJohnson v. Transportation Agency XQS&tmoA Weber's
holding as well asthe standard that it set forth. Although the transportation agency was

subject to the EqualProtection Clause,the court addressed onlythe Title VH issue.
Justice Brennan,writing for the Johnson majority,endhasized that an f'employer adopting

a plan need not point to its own prior discriminatory practices nor even to evidence of
arguable violation on its part."(7-2093)
In contrastto Johnson, Wygant v. Jackson Board ofEducation addressed onlythe
equalprotection standard for public endloyer affirmative action. The court held that
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before a public en^loyer iirq)lemeuts an aflSrmative action plan,the en^loyer must have

"convincing evidence"that it has discriminated in the past. A public etnployer can
independently assessthe need to remedy discrimination and a violation need not be
adjudicated prior to the hx^lementation ofan afBrmative action plan. Ifnon-minority

eroployees challenge such a program,the district court must determine whether there is a

"strong basisin evidence"that a remedial plan is warranted. Further,the program must be
narrowlytailored, which requires the government to consider the efficacy ofrace-neutral
altematives. (7-2094)
Justice O'Connor concurred in Wygantto enq)hasize that thq court's opinion left

significant latitude for public en^loyersto use affirmative action to remedy past

discrimination. Justice O'Connor noted that neither the Constitutipn nor Title VU
requires race conscious remediesto"be accompanied by contenq)oraneousfindings of

actual discrimination aslong asthe public actor has a firm basisfor believing that remedial
action is required,such as a statisticalimbalance sufficient to support a prima facie case of
discrimination."(7-2094)

According to the court,"Congressintended voluntary coropliance to be the
preferred means ofachieving the objectives ofTitle VU." Moreover,in both Johnson and

Wygant,Justice O'Connor stressed,"the Court's and Congress",consistent enq)hasis on
the value ofvoluntary effortsto fiuther the anti-discrimination purposes ofTitle VU.
Because Congressintended enq)loyersto be able to comply volimtarily with Title

VU,Proposition 209must be preenn)ted when it prevents ehq)loyers fi-om achieving
compliance. However,Proposition 209 would be preenpted only when employers need
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to use preferencesto avoid liability. Enq)loyers who have virtually exclusively white or
male workersin traditionally segregated positions can expect to be sued for usingjob

criteria that disproportionately impact a protected class. In some situations, en^loyers

who arguably violate Title W may avoid lawsuits merely by revising selection criteria that
have the effect ofexcluding minorities or women. Additionally,employers may institute
race-conscious measuresthatfeU short ofa preference, such as minqrity notification. In

many instances,however,an employer's notoriety as a discrirninatory, may deter under

represented classesfrom applying,even after the employer changesits hiring criteria.
Thus,a temporary preferential pohcy may be the most effective, and indeed an essential
means ofconcplying with Title Vn. The court recognized thisfact in both Paradise and
Local28,SheetMetal Workers'InternationalAssociation v. EEOC,in which it upheld the

use ofa race conscioushiring goalbecause,in some cases, aflBrmatiye action may be
necessaryin order to effectively enforce Title Vn. Commentatorsnote that"employers
faced with a potential disparate inpact claim(ifthey could not show business necessity)

would be sure to protect themselves only ifthey engaged in someform ofafiSrmative ac
tion;even scrupuloudy race-neutral employment practices would not always be enough."
In fact. Justice Blackmim stated in his Weber concurrence that a prohibition on aflSrmative
action would create irreconcilable tension with Title VITs disparate inpact framework.(7
2096)

Although the Supreme Court'sinterpretations ofTitle\TI and tiie EEGC

guidelines provided Califomia employersthe breathing room to conader race wfren
necessary to remedytheir own discrimination. Proposition 209threatensto eliminate this
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breathing room by exposing en^loyersto lawsuitsfor violating the state constitution.

These countervailing forcestake the risk ofdisparate intact claimsif^enq)loyer's
workforce remains conspicuously devoid ofminorities or women. In exposure to "reverse
discrimination"the law claims, when preferencesto enact remedy discriminates,placing
some employers on a high tightrope without a net beneath them UnlessProposition 209
is preen:q)ted in these situations,it would create a sharp conflict betwem state law and the

Constitution. As Justice O'Connor argued in Wygani,public en^loyers who have a

constitutional dutyto take afiSrmative stepsto eliminate the continuing effects of
discrimination, should not be rendered less capable oferadicating discrimination than their
private sector counterparts who have no corresponding duty. Nonetheless,in Coalition
forEconomicElquity v. Wilson, the Ninth Circuit Court concluded that Title VU does not

preempt Proposition 209. In determining whether Statelaw conflicts Ayith federalpolicy,a
court must ask vriiether state law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution ofthe fiiU purpose and objectives ofCongress." The generaf preemption clause
governing Title Vn states that no "provision ofthis Act shall be construed asinvalidating
any provision ofstate law imless such provision isinconsistent with any ofthe purposes of
this Act." The district court in CoalitionforEconomic Equity v. Wilson concluded that
the plaintifife were likelyto prevail on their Title Vn preemption claim based primarily on

the EEOC guidelines and,to a lesser extent,on the Supreme Court cases construing Title

VITs purposes. The Ninth Circuit Court rejected the district court's holding,citing Title
VITs provision,that nothing in this sub-chapter shall be interpreted to require any[entity]
to grant preferentialtreatment to anyindividual or to any group because ofrace,
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color,religion, sex,or national origin,that language the court conteuded, settled the

matter definitively. (7-2097)
However,in reaching its conclusion that Title Vn and Prpposition 209 are
"entirely consistent,"the Ninth Circuit Court panel misconstrued the central question.
The question was not whether Title Vn requires afiSrmative action,hecause Title VITs

plain language demonstratesthat it doesnot. Rather,the proper inquiryis whether Title

vn requiresthat enq)loyers have discretion to use preferencesto compensate for thenpast discrimination. The plain language ofTitle Vn does not answer this question. By
raising a specious argument and then easily dismissing it,the Ninth Circuit Court avoided

the onlyissue genuinely in dispute. This evasion allowed the Ninth Circuit Court to
sidestep the Supreme Court cases construing Title VITs pmposes,as well asthe EEOC

guidelines wfiich strongly support voluntary aflSrmative action. Thus,the court's cursory
preen:q)tion analysis failed to grapple with the Supreme Court's en^hasis on the
in:q)ortance ofvoluntary aflSrmative action eflfortsto achieve Title VITs pmpose.

Proposition 209 shoxild not be allowed to lock in the vestiges ofpast discrimination by
disabling violatorsfirom conq)lying with the Constitution and Title VU. (7-2098)
Conclusion

Proposition 209's plain language and Supreme Court precedent prevent the

initiative firom constituting a con^rehensive ban ofall consideration o^^race and gender in
public sector enq)loyment. First, government actors in California may be able to use race
and gender in certain limited instances,such as busing and notification programs,without
violating Proposition 209. Second,the Supreme Court's precedents dictate that
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Proposition 209 cannot be applied constitutionally in certain situations. Proposition 209
doesnot restrict federal courtsfrom granting preferentialreliefwhen authorized to do so

bythe Constitution or Title Vn. Additionally, state courts hearing federal causes ofaction
cannotin^ose limits on necessaryfederafremedies.
The question most crucialto the survival ofafSrmative action in California is

whether public en^loyers must waitfor plaintifrsto suethemfor viplations ofTitle Vn
before inq)lementing race or gender-based preferences. When a public errq)loyer has a

history ofenq)loyment discrimination,the answer should be no because Proposition 209

cannot be applied to obstruct conq)hance with federallaw. However,Title VII can only
preempt Proposition 209 when aflBrmative action programs comport with Title YITs

purpose. Thus,ifafBrmative action for diversity purposesis not consistent with Title VII,

it maylegitimatelyfall within Proposition 209's prohibitions. Althou^Proposition 209
may significantly narrow the scope ofaflBrmative action,it cannotforeclose necessary
reheffor violations offederallaw(7-2098).

How Proposition 209 deals with diversity and aflfect it may have on opportunity
for allin the economyis yet to be seen. Chapter three deals with the issues ofthe

economy and the programsin place to help the less advantage to compete. The effect that

Proposition 209 has on education for minorities and women is analyzed and concludes

with a prediction on the effectsProposition 209 wiU have on the Black population.

35

CHAPTER THREE

The Economy,IsThis Econoinic Aparthe^^

Ifthe y.S is mdeed becoming more globalin its approach to business

opportunities and economics,then perhapsit'spickihg up tl^eformer apartheid policies of
South Africa.

Theoretically,Proposition 209 attenq)tsto put everyone pn^qualfooting.
However,since most minority businesses are newer and smaller,they're often unableto

coiq>ete with larger con^anies. An exan^le ofhow a large businessis able to compete
better is asfollows: Large con^any"A"has many projectsfor the same type ofservice.

Con:5)any"A"drawsup agreements with supplierstO obtain suppliejsin large quantities,

thusreducing its unit cost on supplies and consequently making die con:q)any more

corppethive byit's ^ear abilityto obtain its supplies atlower cost. lyiost often,projects
by government are awarded to large contractors because they can affordto offer the
lowest bid. Without i^ecific designationsfor using smaller firms,such asthose addressed
by minority business enterprise(MBE)programsthat were the targets ofPropo^on 209

legislation,filosefirms willfailto win contracts—let alone ^onq)ete~withlarge
con:q)anies.(10-l)

'Tthihk Proposition 209isreally about contracting,"sayslohi^Hill,AfBrmative
Action Con^liance OfhcerforLosAngeles County, ''A significantin^edimentto greater
community businessenterprise(CBE)participation isthe county's practice ofu^g
agreement vendors,"he said in a reportto county supervisors on the utilization status of

CBE's. ''This precludes small businessesthat tend tobe prinaarily rcjinority^d women

owned from coBc^eting," he adds. (1-2)

Although Los Angeles hasthe largest number ofAfrican Americansin the state.

Blacksrank third in population both in LosAngeles and in the state—behind whites and
Mspanics. In a review ofLos Angeles County's contracting efforts, ofthe $1.4 billion in
contracts paid in fiscal year 1996-97,only6.3%(or $93 million)wentto CBE firms. The
county'sfour largest departments;Health services,public social services,public works,
and the dieiiffs department—spent only3% oftheir $100 million in contracts with CBE
firms.The county's official goalisto award 25% ofconstruction commodities and service
contractsto CBE conq)anies. Prior to Proposition 209,the state had an official goal of
15% speciftcally for minorities. (1-2)

"The difficultyis thatthere is less detailed information kept,and it varies bytown
and county,what is actually going on with these programs,"says Conrad. "What comes
out is thatthere have been goals set which are almost never reached,particularly for
minority-owned firms," she adds.

It's this kind ofatmosphere that Craig Jackson,President and CEO ofSaunders

Engineering, a 28-year-old Yorba Linda, California-based conq)any,fears. "We have not

gotten a statejob since Proposition 209 was passed. Although w^ can bid anyjob we
want,the number ofcontracts has virtually dried up,"says Jackson ofhis $40 million
concern. He's not sure for which the tragedyis greater—a 28-year-old firm or a new one.
"We could not have continued the growth pattem the con^any has had without it.
Minority Business Enterprises(MBE)and Disadvantaged Business Enterprises(DBE)

goals. DBE allowed usto be introduced to cHents. It wasthis vehicle that got usin the
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door in the first place. Now the pendulum has swung the other way,"states Jackson.
That's precisely what afiBrmative action goal programs were[designed to create—

opportunity. "So httle ofbusinessis set-asides,"says Harriet Michel,President ofthe
National Minority Suppher Development Councilin New York. "Se^-asides suggest that

there are special dollars put awayfor blacks,whether they're qualified or not. But that's
not true. They still have to meetthe qualifications. There's still conqiietition even though
it may be targeted to minority suppliers,"she explains. (1-2)

Jackson,a 1997 graduate ofthe SmallBusiness Administration's 8(a)program,
says only 45% ofhis busiuess at anytime was 8(a),but the balance wasDBE. With the

Supreme Court also upholding the"Adarand decision,"President CJlinton and the SBA

have dispensed with the DBE category, a move to "mend,not end" afiBrmative action
efiforts. But that doesn't mean all small businesses wDlbe able to compete,even firmsthe
size ofJackson's.(10-2)
"Since there is no SDBE(Small Disadvantaged Business Enterprises)category,

you're either 8(a)or smallbusiness. Butthe kind ofcompaniesFm conpeting against are
$500 miUion mid above,so what's$40 million?"Jackson says,"We dont have the same

kind ofresources. IfI were a larger firm,I could afford to absorb the loss and go on to
something else—that'sthe difference,"explains Jackson,whose company now

enconpasses general contracting. (1-2)
With ofiBcesin Califomia,Virginia, Hawaii,and Georgia,most ofJackson's
business is with the federal government on major municipal contracts. State or

local-sponsored projects make up only a small portion ofhis contracts. The firm currently
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has a $300,000 subcontract vsdth the UC system to rehabihtate a building on its San
Bernardino canq)us.(1-3)

Boston says Jackson's experience is very consistent with that ofother large,
minority-owned firms doing substantial business with government entities. 'It's really,the
bigger firms wJiich are generating the mostjobs and the most revenue,so these are the
firmsthat have this kind ofd^endency,particularly on the pubhc sector,because the

private sector continuesto lock them out. It's also going to be more concentrated in
particular areas,construction firms are going to be hit particularly hard,"notes Boston.
In November,voters in Houston took the first step in heedipg Boston's callto

action by voting 54%to 46%to let affirmative action practices remain by voting down

Proposition"A",says Congresswoman Sheila Jackson-Lee(D-Texas);"It gave us a
chanceto explain vliat affirmative action actually meant"(1-2)
Jackson-Lee saysthe key in Houston wasthe wording ofthe actual ballot measure.
Rather than being asked wliether they wanted to ban "preferentialtreatment,"as wasthe

case in California, Houston voters were asked specifically ifthey wished to ban affirmative

action in city contracting and hiring. "We worked very hard on the wording to minimize
confusion,"she says. "It was clear that this measure would end affirmative action,and we
were not going to stand for that in Houston."

Indeed,Houston has gone against the tide ofanti-affirmative aqtion rhetoric in
recent years. Mayor Bob Lanier signed an executive order in 1995 that increased the city's

affirmative action goals dramatically. Yet,one ofthe concems wasthe apparent lack Ofa
national effort or movementto stem the tide against affirmative action measures. "My
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i]iq>ression isliiat the organizational activity is not happening in the black community,"
says Conrad.(14-1)

Beyond California,ifafiBrmative action is eliminated,it would likely have multiple

effects on public en:q)loyment,suggests Conrad. "We know from studies on a national
levelthat for black women in particular,pubhc enployment has been aforum for upward
mobihty. ffyou look at the share ofmanagement and professional workers among black
women who are enq)loyed in the public arena,it's very hi^."'We don't really know how
many black businesses are dependent upon local government contracts and how many

have obtained them as a direct result ofafiBrmative action,"says Swinton. "But if(federal

legislation passes)it is a significant share,then we're going to see a significant intact."

(1-3) ,
One ofthe early and unexpected consequences ofProposition 209 has been its
intact on institutions ofhigher learning in California. While the effects on employment
and contracting remain to be seen,it doesn't appear wellfor the fiiture.
The Future; A Dream Deferred

For nearly aslong as he could remember,it had been Eric BUr(on's dream to
attend law school at UC-Berkeley. And until recently,he had been at pace to dojust that.

With an LSAT score of160 out ofa possible 180,Burton was accepted to Berkeley's
Boalt Law Schoollast March. It seemed asifyears ofhard work and preparation were
about to pay off That's when the controversy surroimding Proposition 209fell squarely
in Burton's path. "That wasthe schoolI wanted to get into for such a long time,"saysthe
native ofOxnard, California. 'It was mytop choice and my dream school. I went to
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undergraduate school at Stanford and with the expense ofthat,I not only wanted to go to
a state school because Ithought it would be less e?q)ensive,but alsp because Ithou^t
Berkeley was a great school."(1-1)

But Burton'stiming was seriously off. In a foretelling ofProposition 209,the

California Board ofRegents had recently passed Resolution SP-1,which ended afBrmative
action in admissionsin the UC system. Proposition 209 reinforcesthe aflSrmatrve action
ban on the entire UC system as well as other educational outlets such as community

colleges. "What SP-1 does,is saythat you can no longer use race as criteria," says
Comad. "You still have thistwo fold admissions process, one p^based on numerical
criteria and the other based on broader criteria, but race can no longer be a part ofthat

equation. The question is, what wiU the ittphcations be? (1-3)
The answer was not long in coming. Burton turned out to be one ofjust 18,
AMcan American students accepted to Berkeley'sLaw Schoolin 1997. This was down
from 77 blacks accepted in 1996. Burton says his decision wasfiirthpr complicated after

visiting the cartpus during "admit day,"when allthe potential registrants are invited to

tourthe canpus. I wasthe only black there and had really strange yibes. There were
signs and placards saying,'Welcome to Jim Crow Law School"and pinata looking like

Pete Wilson. Burton said,"most ofthe students and faculty he sppke with were
supportive and concemed about the inpact Proposition 209 would have on diversity at
Boalt." The dean said,"he was also concemed aboutthe numbers but, was quick to add

that in this era ofconservatism they had to comply with the regents decision and
Proposition 209." (1-3)
■
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Bwton,who had also been accepted to UCLA,Stanford, Georgetown,The

University ofPennsylvania,and New York University,sayshe"agonized overthe decision
for a couple ofmonths." There exists a lot ofpressure and stress anyway,the first
semester oflaw schoolis difficult enough and then to have allthis media attention. Ijust
don't think it would have been good for me and I wasn't up to the fight. Ultimately,

Burton registered at UCLA AA^iere he's studying publicinterestl^w and policy.(1-3)
Just how many Afiican American students will ultimately be affected by

Proposition 209in California is difficultto determine. Whileit's apparent,the number of
blacks being accepted to Berkeley has declined dramatically. Blacksfind this difficultto
grasp and thus state,"We dontthink California is a fiiendly environrnent anymore,so we

may have to relocate,"(l-3). The table on page 53 reflects the Black and Latino student
drop.

Twistii^g Back The Oock
CaHfbmia en^loys 191,425 state workers. Whites accountfor 110,066(or 57.5%
ofthe total)and Afiican Americansrepresent 22,025(or 11.5%). For the moment,

eirq)loyment policies and practices have not been inq)acted bythe an|;i-aflBrmative action
movement. Based on 1990 U.S. Censusdata,Afiican Americas age 25 and over

represented 5.7% ofthe state laborforce and 11%ofUC's workforce.(1-3)

The UC system is one ofthe largest en:q)loyersin the state. Its nine caucuses and

other sites accountfor 72,637 staffemqployees and 14,700 academic ei^loyees,ofwhich
6,900 are faculty. Carmen Estrada,Director ofEqual Opportunity and Enq)loyee Support

Programsfor the UC Office ofthe President, citesthe yearly payroll at $3 bilhon. The
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1997-98 annual budget is $8.7 bMon,ofwhich $2.1 billion are state funds.(1-3)

Employment ofAfrican Americans,as a whole,decreased slightly by0.5%
statewide. Each campus sets aflSrmative action goals based on qualified personsin the

laborforce and not on the general population at large. Among the 319 UC senior
managers earning over $100,000,14% are minority. Blacksrepresent 5%,Asians
represent 4.4% and Hispanicsrepresent 4.7%. Estrada saysthistqUy does notinclude
otherjob categories with similar salary scales, such asfaculty, deans,physicians, and
coaches. (1-3)

La Rhonda Loeb,Manager ofRecruitment and Enq)loyee Relationsfor L.A. Care
Health Plan, agrees with Estrada. "Diversity is the only approach for good business. It

meansrecognizing and understanding that differences among people exist, and it's all
right,"she says. "By creating an environment ofacceptance,conq)any enq)loyees can

work toward a common goal" Loeb,whose concern is a nonprofit oyerseer ofmanaged
care health plansto Medi-Cal beneficiaries, saysthe organization is"dynamically diverse."

She estimates African Americans and other ethnic minorities represenj:40% oftop
managerial positions. "We have a wayto go,but our goalisto mirror the population that
we serve from top to bottom." (1-3)

In the long run,Loeb predictsProposition 209 will affect the ^ersity ofthe
workforce and how people applyforjobs. Other potential problemsthat could arise are a
reduction in worlq)lace productmty,low morale,increased discriniination, and poor
decision-making by supervisors and managers.(1-4)

Prior to entering the private sector in 1996,Loeb worked as a civilian enq)loyee
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for the federal govenrmentfor 12 years. She recalls getting her firstjob in 1984 as a result
ofafBrmative action. The U.S. Navy recruited top honor students at Lincoln High School

in San Diego,for a specialsunnner work program. "By eliminating afBrmative action,"

^e says,"it only sends a negative message that we're turning back the clock." (1-3)
Modest Income Gains

Brimmer,President ofBriimner & Co.,an economic analysisfirm in Washington,

D.C.,predicts black income to top $450 billion in'98. The growth rate for the American

economy willslow noticeablythrou^the year ahead,and the une]|nployment rate will
remain level. "When we look at 1998,the growth rate ofthe economy wiU moderate
somevriiat,"says Brimmer,a former member ofthe Federal Reserve Board. 'Tt will

converge more toward itslong-run potential growth rate,which I estimate will be between
2% and 2.75%.I don't see any major shocks on the horizon and anything to disturb the
forecast. So the real economy islikelyto e?q)and moderately,inflation to remain subdued

and en^loymentto increase." (1-3)
The housing sector was a significant source ofstrength for the economy in 1996.

The quickened pace ofactivity was supported bylower mortgage interest rates and again
last year in disposable income. Despite somewhat higher mortgage ratesin 1998,the level
ofhousing starts will most likely continue to rise. The slight easing ofrates in 1996 gave

a boost to housing starts last year. Brimmerforecaststhat mortgage rate on new homes
mayrisethisyear fi-om 7.79%to 8.01 %. (1-3)

He also projected that the 1997black laborforce would expand to 15.6 million, or
11 %ofthe total workforce. Black eirqployment would rise to 14.1 million, or 10.9% of
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the total 130 million en^loyed. Black unenq)loyment,he predicted, would average 9.3%,
or 1.4 million, vs.4.4%for whites and 5.1%for the total civilian labor force. The

economist does note some disturbing trendsthat wiU intact AMcan American statusin

the years ahead. In the short run,he predicts no major changesin the labor force. The
continued ejq)ansion ofthe U.S. economyin 1998 wiU enable blacksto make fiirther

moderate gainsin their economic position. But,he cautions,blacks haye shared less in the
economic expansion ofthe countrythan other races because ofthe growing segment of
incarcerated blacks. "That has a substantialimpact on the potentiallabor supply.

Increasingly,blacks whom you expect to show up in the labor force don't get there,"notes
Brimmer. "That results in a loss ofjobs and income,which is gomg to be a very big area
ofconflict and cost to society."(1-3)

As other ethnic populations grow.Brimmer predictsthat blacks may end up on the
short end. "We see whiteslosing ^ares,but the gains are being enjoyed primarily by
Asians and to a lesser extent Hispanics,warn Brimmer Down the road,as concpetition

increases,it will not be Blacks versus Whites,its going to be Blacks versus everybody
else, unless conditions change dramatically we risk dropping out at the bottom." Thisis
further demonstrated by the depiction on table,"Money Income by Race",on page 52.
(1-3)
Conclusion

Today,afl:er a generation ofprogress,Americans'commitmentto equal

opportunity,not onlyfor AfiicMiAmericans,butfor other minority^oups,and for
women are at a crossroads. A wellfinanced,politically powerfiil movement dedicated to
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ending afBrmative action has made significant gains. Although itsleaders claim they
support equal opportunity,they have,in feet,hnmched an,all out attack on one ofthe
fairest, most eflFective toolsfor ending discrimination. Their attack is based on two

demonstrablyfelse premises: that afBrmative action is no longer needed,and that it isin all
itsforms unfair.

AfBrmative action opponents say that it's no longer needed because discrimination
is a thing ofthe past. But while it istrue that much progress has been made since the
enactment ofthe Civil Rights Act of1964 and other civil right?legislation,it is also true
that these laws have not been selfexecuting,nor did they change centuries of

discriminatory habits, customs and attitudes. As a result many avenues ofopportunity
have remained narrow and constricted, available only to the relativelyfew. The evidence
clearly provesthat the playing field isn't level yet:
1. A majority ofwhite Americans stiU believe that African and Latino Americans,
are less intelhgent, working less, and are less patriotic than whites.

2. Government public education spending is clearly linked to race. Schools

serving mostly minority,inner city children receive about one-halfthe money
per student that schoolsin surrounding white suburbs receive.
3. In 1990,the average black male worker earned $731 for every $1000 earned by
a white male worker. Latino men earned $810for every $1,000 earned by
similarly educated white men.

4. Although white males make up only 43% ofthe workforce,they occupy97%
ofthe top executive positions at America's 1,500 largest corporations.
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The largest group ofAmericansto benefit fiom afiBrmative action thusfar is
women. Before 1964,women were excluded from many higher paying occupations and

professions based on stereotype,custom and law. There are no women's police ofi&cers,
truck drivers,or pilots, and women'slawyers and doctors wefe rare. But despite
progress,many barriersto fiill equahty remain:
1. Men are still99% ofaU auto mechanics and carpenters;98% ofaU firefi^ters;
97% ofall pilots, and 95% ofall welders.

2. Overall,American women eam only 72% ofvriiat men makefor cortq)arable
work.

3. Women hold only 3-5% ofsenior positionsin the privatg sector.

Opponents claim afiBrmative action forces employersto "give preference"to less

qualified minorities. Equating afiBrmative action with quotas,they argue that color-blind
laws are fairer than those that take race into account. But afiBrmative action is not a quota

system or aform ofreverse discrimination. Nor doesit give preferentialtreatment to
unqualified minorities and women.

Quotashave always been used as a method ofexclusion,not inclusion. Before the
Civil Rights Act,quotas were used to keep out qualified members ofunpopular racial or
rehgious groups. That is whythey are intensely disliked bythe pubhc and have been
strongly disfavored by the Supreme Court.
Goals and time tablesfound in afiBrmative action plans are not the same thing as

quotas. They are a nondiscriminatory way ofmaking sure that those who were previously
excluded are finally brought into the workplace,and a way ofmeasuring whether
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discrimination is being reduced. Withoutthem,enqjloyers with a history ofdiscriminatory

practices would continue"bui^ess as usual." With them,en^loyers must make effortsto
recruit and hire qualified women and/or minoritiesfor vacant positionsfrom which they
were previously excluded. Ihisisthe opposite ofdiscrittunation.

Enq)loyers and universities have always engaged in forms of "preferential
treatment." It was only when race and gender became a factor in the effort to end
discrimination that preferences became a problem Yet there are many examples oflong

accepted preferentialtreatment. University preference ofveterans oyer non-veterans, or
children ofalumni over other youths is one exanq)le;en^loyers hiring the sons and
daughters oftheir economic and social equalsisanother.

Requiring that qualified minorities and women be actively recruited and,whenever

appropriate,hired. That isthe only way previously excluded minorities and women can
gain a toehold in cottq)anies, occupations, and schoolsthat were previously reserved for

white me«|i. It'sfeimessitself
Although anti-civil rights advocates con^lain of"reverse disjcrimination,"in feet
only 1.7% ofall race-based chargesfiled with the equalEn^loyment Opportunity

Commission have been filed by white males. Thisis because the Suppme Court has
already ruled that the interests ofwhite incumbents must be protected. When a company

with a history ofpast discrimination passes over a white man and hires a quahfied minority
or women instead,that isn't "reverse discrimination."

The most dishonest claim made by afBrmative action's opponentsisthat since the

U.S. ^ould be a color bhnd society, civil rights remediesthat take race into accoimt are
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perpetuating discrimination. Reaching a color blind society requires being conscious

about color. There is,unfortunately,abundant proofthatthe U.S.is npt yet a color blind
society. Attitudinal studies show that stereotypes are pervasive. In one,53% ofthe white
surveyed respondentsjudged BlackslessinteUigent than Whites,and 62%though Blacks
were'less hard working." These sometimes,unconscious stereotypes have an intact on

Black opportunitiesin the real world. Studies show tiiat negative stereotypes about
women persist as well. They are still believed to have lessleadership ability than mai.

Thelaw ofaflSrmative action has been evolving since the C|vilRights Act was
passed in 1964. AfSrmatrve action plans are sometimes court mposed and other times
tbey are adopted on a voluntary basis. To be legal,these plans sho^lld:
•

Be flexible,preferably using amendable goals and timetablesto increase

minority and female participation,ratherthan rigid nui^erical quotas.
•

Generally not interfere with the legitimate seniority expectations ofcurrent
employees.

•

Be tenq)orary,lasting no longer thap necessary to remedythe
discrimination.

Some American businesses have had aflBrmative action pro^amsin:q)osed upon

them by courts,but many more have adopted them voluntarily for two main reasons.

First, vriiite males make up a minority ofthe American workforce,so firmsthatfavor
white men wQlfind themselvesfishing in a shirking poolofpotential en(q)loyees. Second,
a diverse workforce creates a con^etitrve corporate edge with consumers ofdififerent
races and backgrounds. It isn't surprising that among the many organizationsthat
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opposed the 1996 public referendum to end aflBrmatrve action in California were the
California Business Roimdtables,the San Francisco Chamber ofCommerce and the Los

Angeles Business Alliance.

In 1964,the year the CivilRights Act was passed,only4% ofAMcan Americans
25 years or older had con^leted four years ofcollege,compared to 10% ofwhitesin the
same age group. By 1993,the figure for blacks had gone up to 12%. Thisis because
during that 29-year period,the university community had taken afiSrmative stepsto recruit
and admit more minorities.

Although affirmative action in education came under early legal attack,its
constitutionality was upheld bythe Supreme Court in 1974 in the case ofUniversity of
California v. Baklce. In Bakke,the court ruled that while,"racial and ethnic distinctions

ofany sort are inherently suspect,"a university could take race e?q)hcitly into account

under a^ppropriate circumstances.
Anti-civil rights pundits argue against affirmative action on the groimdsthat it
"stigmatizes"Afiican Americans and other minority student who are assumed to be

incon^etent becausethey were admitted based on color,not on mer^t. This argumentis
absurd and distorts the way affirmative action works.
Harvard College,an affirmative action pioneer, w4iose policy has been emiilated

throu^out the country worksthis way: after admitting the most qualified applicants,the

admissions committee looks at thatlarge middle group ofapplicants v^ho are admissible
and beheved to be capable ofdoing good work. In evaluating each applicant,race maytip
the balance in his or herfavor,just as coming from a particular geographic region might.
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Race can be a plus,but onlyifthe applicant possessesthe qualificationsfor admission.
Although the percentage ofAfrican-American college graduates hasincreased
from 4%to 12% i^ce 1964,the percentage ofwhite college graduates has gone from
10%to 23%. This persistent gap tells usthat aflBrmative action ia higfier education is still
needed. See UC chart on page 53.

Ultimately, we have a long wayto go before we see a cortq)let€!color blind society.
In order to achieve this goal,the Nation as a whole wiU have to see the need and the

in^ortance to treat all races equally. Ifwefeilin this effort,the Natiop will be the greater
looser and it will go the way that other Nations have gone who have not considered the
need to provide equal opportunityfor all with the same merits. A good exan^le ofthisis

what happened in South Afiica. The upraising which took place wasthe only wayleft for
the Black Africansin that country to be noticed and given an opportunity. Isthis viat we
want to happen in this Nation?
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Money Income by Race(in billions of dollars)
1996

1995

Category

Amount

% ofTotal

All households

88.21

$4,760,3
4,167.4

100.00

White

$4,477.8
3,949.1

Black

351.9

7.86

393.1

8.26

Other races

176.0

3.93

199.8

4.20

Category

Amount

% ofTotal

Amount

All households

$5,030.7
4,381.7

100.00

100.00

1997

White
Black
Other races

Amount

% ofTotal
87.54

1998

% ofTotal

$5,272.2

100.00

87.10

572.6

86.73

25.1

8.45

454.4

8.62

223.9

4.45

245.2

4.65

Calculations by Brimmer & Co.Inc. Data for 1995 from the U.S. Census Bureau.
Estimatesfor 1996 through 1998 by Brimmer & Co.
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UC's

President ran a simulation on how many graduate students would have entered in 1994
using the mandate ofproposition 209.
. Actual
Fall 1994

Simulated
Enrollment

Change

309

178

-131

Enrollment

Category
Afiican American
American Indian

89

2,289
1,146

Asian

Chicano/Latino

'51"
2,740

451

-39

999

-14

261

272

White/other

3,876

11
115

TOTAL

7,970

3,991
8,229

Fihpino

Change in%

Category

% ofTotal

Simulated %

Freshman

ofFreshman

Enrollment

Enrollment

African American .

-42.4

3.9

2.2

American Indian

-43.3

1.1

0.6

19.7

Asian

Chicano/LathiO

-12.9

28.7
■

14.4

.

33.3
12.1

Fihpino

4.0

3.3

3.3

White/Other

3.0

48.6

48.5

Source: University ofCahforma,Oflhce ofthe Presi
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